A lot of confusion over Israel’s aggressive strategy along its borders can be cleared up with the following statement: That was before October 7.
For example: Why is Israel going so far into Lebanon with plans to hold territory for as long as it takes until Hezbollah is disarmed? In the past, Israel has never directed the evacuation of so many Lebanese villages or insisted the residents of those towns would be kept from returning until Israel’s objectives were completed.
Well, that was before October 7.
Reuters reports that the French government wants Israel to agree to a cease-fire before requiring Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah, but Israel is resisting. The French are no doubt reminding the Israelis that that is the order in which those tasks were handled in the past.
To which Israel might reply: Well, that was before October 7. Now we know better. Now we want to make sure the job is done. Now we understand that we have to prevent villagers from South Lebanon from returning to their homes because otherwise Hezbollah rockets will stop Israeli civilians from being able to move back to their own homes.
Reuters also says Israel is wary of being pulled into fruitless negotiations: “Israel has rebuffed an offer of direct talks from Beirut as too little, too late by a government that shares its goal of wanting Hezbollah disarmed but fears that acting against it could risk civil war, sources familiar with the situation said.”
Again, “too late” here means after October 7.
For some reason, the world still hasn’t quite grasped how much has changed since that day, at least for Israelis. One reason is the terrifying “what if” that Israeli policymakers have had to ask themselves: What if Hezbollah had invaded along with Hamas on October 7, when Israel’s defenses were down and it had to fight to regain territory within its own borders?
What if Hamas’s control of the highway near the Gaza Envelope meant a Lebanese convoy could be on the scene within two hours? By many accounts, it took IDF units twice as long to reach Kibbutz Be’eri that day.
Even without the prospect of an actual Hezbollah ground invasion, consider: Hamas pushed Israel’s border residents into retreat, essentially moving the border itself for a brief period. Hezbollah periodically forces the same effect on residents of the north just by using rockets. And while both of those groups were working to herd Israelis into the center of the country, Iran was developing the capability to overwhelm Israeli air defenses with its ballistic-missile arsenal.
Each of those three threats must be neutralized. There cannot be a force in Gaza able to slaughter communities on the other side of the fence. There cannot be an arsenal in Lebanon that forces the evacuation of Israeli towns. And Iran cannot be allowed to retain or reacquire the means to make the country dwell in bomb shelters.
October 7 revealed what can never happen again. That’s why a yellow line divides Gaza. Lebanon is getting its own line, whatever color it ends up being designated.
New lines, new rules, new terms—all set by Israel. That’s how this works now.
The old rules put Israel’s enemies in a great position to strike at the Jewish state’s vulnerabilities. But, well, that was before October 7. They will not get a second shot at it.
