Keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down. That was the purpose of Nato, in the words of Lord Ismay, the Alliance’s first secretary-general. Yet, the organisation is currently being put to the test on two of those missions. With US President Donald Trump openly threatening not to protect imperilled member states who have not been spending on defence, the threat of the Americans pulling out increases. But so too does the threat of the Russians pushing in.
Last week, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) assessed that Russia could pose “a significant military challenge to Nato allies, particularly the Baltic states, as early as 2027”. If there is a ceasefire in Ukraine by mid-2025, Russia may have long-term confrontation in mind. According to the German security services, it has been rebuilding its military capacity and could quickly redeploy units to imperil Nato’s eastern flank. But while we can all agree that Russian leader Vladimir Putin would prefer Nato not to exist, would he truly be willing to wage war to make that happen?
It is easy to dismiss talk of Russia-Nato war as fearmongering or Cold War era thinking. Yet, the UK government is updating its contingency plans. Meanwhile, those who have engaged in military planning admit taking the prospect seriously. Gabrielius Landsbergis has first-hand experience of gauging Putin’s military goals. As Foreign Minister of Lithuania during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he was forced to confront the possibility that his country might be next on Putin’s list. “It was on many people’s minds that if Ukraine really does fall in a couple of days, it was obvious that Putin’s ambition would not stop with Kyiv. If he can go, he will continue,” he tells me.
Attacking a Nato member would have brought Putin into direct confrontation with the whole of the Alliance. But, according to Landsbergis, that wouldn’t stop him. “I think that his ultimate goal is dismantling the Western-run global system and some of the targets are very close to him.” It is a view shared by General Sir Richard Shirreff, former Nato Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who tells me that “the challenge that Nato faces is to prevent it [the conflict] turning into a shooting war because if Putin were to get his way I’m absolutely convinced it could”.
Landsbergis and Shirreff are in agreement about the most likely scenario in which Putin would attack. A false flag operation in the Baltics, followed by local Russian minorities demanding protection. In Shirreff’s book 2017: War with Russia, he envisaged that, after an invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s agents would foment unrest in Latvia by murdering pro-Kremlin activists and carving insignia on their corpses to pin the blame on Latvian nationalists. Moscow’s snipers then execute Russian speakers at a Riga protest. All this lays the pretext for Moscow to invade the Baltics, ostensibly on a mission to protect Russian minorities in those countries.
Landsbergis sees two possible options for such an incident. Firstly, the Suwałki Gap — “there is a trainline going from Russia through Belarus all the way through to Kaliningrad and it brings Russian non-military passengers”. Secondly, Narva in Estonia — “it’s right on the border, it’s a town mostly inhabited by Russians and fits the Russian ‘save the Russians everywhere in the world’ narrative quite well”.
The “how” seems established, but the “when” is trickier to assess. The Russian Defence Minister has indicated that there could be war within a decade, Danish intelligence has said within five years, and now the IISS is claiming it could potentially be two. Sir Richard estimates that Putin may be ready in three to five years, depending upon the impact of casualties in Ukraine and how the Russian economy fares. What is clear is that Putin is not ready yet. He is “completely fixed on Ukraine and has no capacity for anything else” for the time being.
Yet, if Trump successfully negotiates a ceasefire in Ukraine, that could free Putin’s hand. The US President is also encouraging Putin’s ambitions in other ways. Danish intelligence assessed that Russia would be more likely to use force against Nato allies if it felt the Alliance was “military weakened” or “politically divided”. This is “particularly true if Russia assesses that the US cannot or will not support the European NATO countries”.
Landsbergis agrees with this assessment. The messaging from the US over the last couple of months “definitely reassures” Putin that “he can expect changes in European security to a point where it would be feasible for him to consider this option (of war)”. Two main factors would influence his decision: “the United States no longer being present in Europe and Ukraine not being able to defend its front”.
“The messaging from the US over the last couple of months ‘definitely reassures’ Putin.”
Trump’s actions now may be eroding Alliance unity enough to be laying the foundations for a Russian invasion. Sir Richard tells me that the US President’s tariffs and threats to annex Canada and Greenland are “hitting right at the heart of Alliance cohesion”. “The basis of the post-Cold War order, of the unity of purpose and Alliance cohesion and America being unshakably in support of the West, is starting to be undermined,” he says. “Give it a few more years of the major European economies failing to step up to the mark on defence spending, of Trump economics and tariffs, and all that begins to make Nato quite conceivably look like the busted flush which Putin thought it was in 2021 (with the fall of Afghanistan). Putin reckons that Nato is bluffing with Article 5 because Trump has said ‘I’m giving up on you’”. The Russian leader may decide that any invasion would have to take place during Trump’s term of office, so as to benefit from the White House being occupied by a man who might not rush in to save Europe.
So if the Russian leader does order his troops into Nato territory, what would happen then? Military historian Dr Peter Caddick-Adams believes that the initial stages would not go well for Russia. “Nato would close the Baltic Sea to Russia which means that it couldn’t get anything out of St Petersburg or Kaliningrad which would ground its entire navy. Turkey would do the same thing in the Black Sea. Russia would be left with a conventional force which is largely dissipated.” However, Sir Richard is more pessimistic, telling me that “the traditional Russian way of war is mass firepower, total destruction, brutality, onslaught and all the terrible things they’ve done to the Ukrainian civilian population. We’re talking about massive conventional operations, conventional fighting, tank battles, destruction of cities in Eastern Europe.” The ruthlessness would not only serve Putin’s war aims but also satisfy a desire for personal vengeance after years of the West supplying Ukraine with weaponry and thereby frustrating his ambitions.
There is also the risk of nuclear blackmail, as we saw during Russia’s war in Ukraine. Sir Richard says that Russia’s Zapad exercises have envisaged the occupation of a Baltic nation followed by blackmailing of the West: “If Nato threatens to come back at you, all you do is threaten the Nato capitals within range of Kaliningrad. You then present decision makers in London or Washington with a choice — accept it or risk nuclear escalation. The Russians would gamble that nobody is going to risk the destruction of Western civilisation and all the cities of Western Europe for the sake of the population of a Baltic state.” Such a strategy may prove effective, the West having already judged Moscow’s nuclear warnings as no idle threats. In October 2022, then US President Joe Biden said that Putin “was not joking when he talks about the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons.”
For any Brits reassuring themselves that a conflict would be restricted to a Russian occupation on the other side of Europe or tank battles in the Polish countryside, Sir Richard has a rude awakening. “If it turned into a shooting war, you could expect hypersonic missiles which are within range of London to be taking out key buildings as well as key sites across the United Kingdom.” Lacking an Iron Dome, Britain is “completely defenceless against that sort of threat”. “I cannot see how the army could generate the force levels required without conscription. The army would not have time to recruit and train anyway because this would very quickly become a war of national survival. Sabotage? Absolutely. Assassinations? Absolutely.”
And what would be Putin’s goals in warring against Nato? When would he be satisfied? “I would specify his objectives as decoupling America from European security, seeing the destruction or at least the neutralisation of Nato and the achievement of what he described as the most appropriate security settlement for Europe, being a new Yalta — in other words, a Russian empire in Eastern Europe on the bones of the old Warsaw Pact,” says Sir Richard. Putin once characterised the break-up of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century”. If he goes to war, he may not be finished until that has been reversed.
So what can the West do now to discourage Putin? Effective deterrence, including Nato membership for Ukraine, and strong defence spending are key, according to the ex-general. “It should be at 4-5%”, he says, even though “this is a really unpopular thing for a Labour government that’s committed to growth and that faces the prospect of having to make some really tough decisions about tax and cuts to public services”. However, while Labour has pledged to raise UK defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, the promise came shortly before a meeting between Prime Minister Keir Starmer and President Trump, suggesting that it may have been more to appease the White House than from any real commitment to fending off Russia long-term.
Besides, it is not as though Moscow has shied away from aggression towards the West already. “The war goes on against NATO by hybrid asymmetric means”, explains Sir Richard, listing allegations of Russian interference in Western elections and the 2018 Salisbury Novichok attack. He says that some activity may even be conducted with an eye to preparing for a larger battle, such as reports of drones near RAF airbases. “All that kind of stuff is in the Russian playbook.” In Putin’s mind, Ukraine is merely the frontline. Nato and Russia are already at war.
