The brutal 2018 Saudi killing of Jamal Khashoggi was a diplomatic setback for Riyadh, which the royal family has spent the better part of a decade cleaning up. The Saudis’ rehabilitation was helped along by Donald Trump, whose administration at times seemed to act as Riyadh’s crisis-PR team. So I am puzzled as to why Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is choosing to pick his fights around the Mideast in ways that maximize the affront to the Trump administration, threatening the president’s dearest foreign-policy legacy.
These are, by the way, two separate questions: “Why are the Saudis picking fights with Israel and the United Arab Emirates” and “Why are the Saudis undermining the U.S. specifically?” Neither seems a good idea. And though this current orneriness hasn’t resulted in a gruesome state execution, it is reminiscent of the Khashoggi killing in that it suggests bin Salman’s biggest problem is not that he plays hardball but that he plays hardball badly.
That is: The crown prince’s arrogance has more than once started to look like a liability.
Bloomberg today reports that the Saudis are deepening their split with the UAE in a way that is starting to make the business world nervous. What began as a fight over the UAE’s military involvement in Yemen has arguably escalated since the UAE vowed to remove its military personnel from the area near the Saudi border. From Bloomberg:
“Some UAE-based firms have reported problems securing Saudi business visas, the people said. It’s not clear how widespread the issue is or whether it marks a change of policy by the Saudi government, which has been pushing for companies to have their regional headquarters in the kingdom for several years.
“At least one UAE-based supplier to Saudi Arabia is weighing whether to start building inventory as a cushion, while some funds and companies are evaluating plans to open offices in the kingdom to insulate themselves should there be curbs on cross-border activity, the people said.”
The article does add that UAE financial firms are still buying Saudi bonds, and that no one’s in panic mode yet. But Riyadh’s volatility hasn’t gone unnoticed.
Today, bin Salman told Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that he will not allow the U.S. to use Saudi airspace to attack the Islamic Republic in the event that Trump decides to order strikes in retribution for Tehran’s bloody crackdown on dissent, in which it has already killed thousands of civilians. Perhaps it’s a feint, but a clumsy one if so—by now the Trump-Pezeshkian staredown has become personal for the president. Trump’s credibility is arguably on the line, and bin Salman is pooh-poohing Trump’s threats. The Saudis have already leaked their opposition to a strike as well, so any appearance of siding with Iran is gratuitous and undermines the attempts to isolate Tehran. That, in turn, may cost more innocent Iranian protesters their lives.
Republican Sen. Linsday Graham issued a public finger-wagging to Riyadh this morning: “To Saudi Arabia: I have tried to work hard to chart a new path for relations between your country, the United States and the region. I have tremendous respect for many of the changes that have been embraced. However, the Kingdom’s attack on the United Arab Emirates and their silence regarding the Syrian government’s constant assault on the Kurds has to change. Please understand that I am smart enough to know that Saudi Arabia has influence on the Syrian government, and I expect them to use it to keep the region from falling further into chaos.”
Part of the reason for the frustration with bin Salman is that the Saudis aren’t merely backing away from the Abraham Accords themselves; they appear to be trying to kill any momentum toward expanding them to include other countries. “The strategic decision to pursue reconciliation with Israel has been replaced by a wild incitement campaign, whose depth and damage are questionable in terms of awareness,” Amit Segal wrote last week, adding that “Al Arabiya has been worse than Al Jazeera in the texts broadcast against any normalization with Israel.”
Segal had suggested, convincingly, that with Iran’s nuclear program having already been set back significantly, Riyadh can afford some daylight with the West. But the Saudis ought to be careful: Undermining the Abraham Accords also undermines the postwar Gaza settlement by strengthening Islamist governments like Turkey and Qatar. Straddling the fence is one thing; bin Salman is starting to treat the U.S. as an adversary, and a bipartisan crew in Congress would be happy to return the favor.
