Now is the time to strike a partnership.
Great power competition now hinges on technological dominance. While the U.S. may master the machines of progress, we are faltering in securing the power that makes them run, a deficiency that our greatest competitor is beginning to weaponize against us.
Lithium exemplifies this dynamic. Beyond its well-known use in electric vehicles, lithium’s strategic value lies in securing the energy-intensive infrastructure that powers broader technological competition. Data centers—the backbone of artificial intelligence and cloud computing—increasingly rely on lithium-ion batteries, which China subjected to export controls last month. This is not an abstraction: lithium is more than a commodity—it has become a foundational national security asset.
And here is where Bolivia comes in. Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni, the largest salt flat in the world, also hosts the world’s largest identified lithium reserves, yet it accounts for less than 1% of global production. The U.S. Geological Survey does not even register Bolivia in its production totals, even as its estimated reserves have grown to 23 million tons in 2025. That’s enough lithium to electrify nearly three times the current global vehicle fleet.
More importantly, the end of socialist rule in Bolivia is coming very soon with the upcoming inauguration of Rodrigo Paz, a leader who campaigned on a “Capitalism for All” platform, on November 8. That narrow window offers the United States a rare opportunity to shape events in the Western Hemisphere rather than merely react to them. Washington must act decisively by authorizing a high-level interagency delegation to launch the “U.S.-Bolivia Technology and Prosperity Partnership,” a compact designed to advance one of America’s most important strategic interests while securing a cooperative government capable of supporting broader regional objectives.
The United States can offer Bolivia a superior alternative to the extractive strategies pursued by China and Russia while serving as a partner in modernization. The U.S. should share our technology and technical assistance with Bolivia’s state-owned Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB), including the deployment of advanced U.S. direct lithium extraction (DLE) technology. This is a genuine win-win. Traditional solar evaporation is slow, taking 18 months or more, and consumes vast quantities of freshwater, a critical constraint for the high-altitude, landlocked Andean nation.
Competing DLE approaches, particularly solvent-extraction methods favored by some Chinese firms, falter against Bolivia’s high-magnesium brines, requiring extensive pretreatment and heavy chemical use. The U.S. advantage lies in selective-absorption DLE. Our firms lead the world in this technology, which employs molecularly engineered “sieves” that ignore magnesium and other contaminants and target only lithium ions. This approach effectively bypasses the “poison” that has locked up Bolivia’s lithium for decades.
The result is not just extraction—it is asymmetric leverage. We could offer Bolivia a technical solution that decisively outperforms entrenched Chinese and Russian methods. The fact that Russia’s Rosatom ($976 million) and China’s CATL ($1.4 billion) contracts have already faced opposition in Bolivia’s courts and congress further makes this the perfect moment to sign a big, beautiful deal on Day One of the Paz Administration.
What about political instability? That’s a fair question, especially considering how Venezuelan expropriations have inflicted heavy losses on American firms.
First, the U.S. can provide transparent, high-standard capital investment by authorizing the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to initially offer up to $2 billion in loan guarantees and political-risk insurance for a joint venture between U.S. firms and YLB, with YLB retaining a majority stake to guard against resource nationalism.
Second, the United States should provide tangible benefits to local communities. The partnership should fund critical infrastructure—transportation, clean water, and electricity grids—in the Potosí region. To ensure accountability, a portion of revenues must flow into a Bolivian-managed “Uyuni Prosperity Fund,” which the United States will help establish, oversee, and support, with technical assistance in transparency and auditing.
President-elect Paz inherits an economic crisis and a population deeply wary of foreign exploitation. Against the backdrop of previous opaque and contested deals, this initiative offers the perfect opportunity for a transparent, high-standard U.S. partnership. This could be fantastic PR in our hemisphere, a point some realists may not stress but is worth considering.
The U.S.-Bolivia Technology & Prosperity Partnership would be explicitly designed as a superior model, giving Paz the political cover needed to replace the Sino-Russian deals. By guaranteeing a 51% majority stake for YLB, leveraging DFC financing, and ensuring tangible local infrastructure benefits, the partnership would transform the country’s relationship with the U.S. from mere extraction to perceived co-ownership, mitigating accusations of neocolonialism and fostering long-term political resilience.
Swift execution, paired with a targeted public communications strategy, can deliver early wins that justify the initial risk while laying the foundation for enduring stability—making Day One action essential. Crucially, the deal can promise enough short-term gains to justify rapid investment despite potential future political shifts, while simultaneously advancing the secondary goal of ensuring Paz’s success, which this initiative is uniquely positioned to achieve.
The geostrategic payoff of this partnership would be substantial. Securing a stable, high-volume lithium supply chain in the Western Hemisphere would allow the U.S. to reset its critical mineral strategy. We once understood this instinctively. In 1942, before decades of globalism dulled our strategic thinking, Venezuelan oil, refined in Aruba and Curaçao, supplied 95% of the fuel that sustained the U.S. East Coast. A secure supply chain nearby shortens logistical lines, reduces vulnerability to disruption in potential conflicts, and consolidates U.S. influence in its own hemisphere.
By locking in Bolivia, Washington can strategically deprioritize high-risk lithium scrambles in politically unstable regions. We can leave the Chinese with Zimbabwe while securing the high-volume input needed to bridge any supply gaps until U.S. domestic mining projects, which often face 7-15 year permitting timelines, fully mature. It is important to note that as is the case with oil, there is more than the much-exalted principle of energy independence in this picture. Questions about price stability similar to those that surround OPEC, with which our president has had issues, also come into play.
China has long grasped the importance of our hemisphere. Now, it is our turn. While many Western analysts love to lump Latin America together with Africa (the “Global South”) as comparable resource frontiers, the reality is quite different. Latin America is closer, wealthier, relatively more stable, and far better integrated into the global economy. In the last two decades, roughly 70% of Chinese loans to Latin America have been directed toward its energy sector—double the share of its lending in Africa. Beijing is willing to spend more, across greater distances, to secure resources in our neighborhood than is the U.S. That alone should have raised alarms in Washington. Fortunately, we are beginning to wake from our long slumber.
